THE
THEOLOGY OF AL-ASHʿARĪ

The Arabic texts of al-Ashʿarī's *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ* and *Risālat Istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*, with briefly annotated translations, and Appendices containing material pertinent to the study of al-Ashʿari

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IN THE NAME OF GOD,

THE MERCIFUL, THE BENEFICENT!

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! His blessing be upon our Master, Muḥammad, and his household, and his Companions! God's peace to them all!

1. *We have it* from the Shaikh, the Imām, Jamāl al-Dīn Abu'l-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh the Quraishite, with a licence written in his own hand, that he said: *We have it* from the jurisprudent, the learned Imām, Fakhru'l-Dīn Abu'l-Maʿālī Muḥammad b. Abi'l-Faraj b. Muḥammad b. Baraka of Mosul, when it was read to him — and I heard it in his masjid (1) in the Sultan's Market in Baghdad, on Tuesday, the eighth of Shawwāl, in the year 600 (June 9, 1204) — and it was said to him: You read (it) to the Shaikh, the most trustworthy Imām, Abū Manṣūr al-Mubārak b. ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad of Baghdad the day that he made you recite (it) in his Ribāṭ (2), known as « Ribāṭ al-Barbahīriyya », to the east of the City of Peace (Baghdad), in the year 573/1177-8 » — and he acknowledged it.

We were informed by the Shaikh, the Imām, the Ḥāfiẓ, Jamāl al-Dīn Abu'l-Faḍl ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad (b.) Ibrāhīm b. Khālid, who was known as Ibnu'l-Ikhwa (3), in the year 542/1147-8: *I was*

(1) i.e. his mosque, probably called « his » because he was accustomed to lecture there, or to pray there.

(2) A kind of « religious » house — cf. art. *Ribāṭ*, in EI or Hwb.

(3) Or — Ukhuwwa.

told (4) by the Shaikh, Abu'l-Faḍl Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Nātilī in his house in Māzandarān, when I read it to him: *I have it* from Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. Hārūn of Shīrāz: *who had it* from ʿAlī b. Rustam: *who related* that ʿAlī b. Mahdī (5) said: *I heard* that peerless Shaikh, the Shaikh of Shaikhs, Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, say:

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! And God's blessing be upon Muḥammad the Prophet, and his goodly familiars, and his Companions, the elect Imāms!

THE OBJECTION TO KALĀM

2. A certain group of men (6) have made ignorance their capital. Finding reasoning and inquiry into religious belief too burdensome, they incline towards the easy way of servile sectarianism (7). They calumniate him who scrutinizes the basic dogmas of religion and accuse him of deviation. It is innovation and deviation, they claim, to engage in kalām about motion and rest, body and accident, accidental modes and states (8), the atom and the leap (9), and the attributes of the Creator.

(4) Lit. — « The Shaikh.... told us... »

(5) This *isnād*, or chain of names, does not seem long enough to go back directly to Ashʿarī himself, who died in 324. Perhaps, if it is authentic, some names have been dropped.

(6) Representatives of a rigid traditionism — some of the Ḥanbalites ?

(7) Arabic: *al-taqlīd* — unquestioning acceptance of the authority of another. Cf. art. *Taḳlīd*, III, in EI or Hwb.

(8) Arabic: *al-alwān wa'l-akwān*. According to ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl al-Dīn*, 40 ff.) these are the two main divisions of accidents. The phrase, therefore, might be translated simply by « the various kinds of accidents ».

(9) Arabic: *al-ṭafra*. This seems to refer to al-Naẓẓām's theory of the « leap » — cf. *Tritton*, 93, and *Madhhab al-Dhurra ʿinda'l-Muslimīn* (Arabic trans. of Pines, *Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre*) 12, and 141.

3. They assert that if that were a matter of guidance and rectitude, the Prophet and his Caliphs and his Companions would have discussed it. For, they say, the Prophet did not die until he had discussed and amply explained all needful religious matters. He left nothing to be said by anyone about the affairs of their religion needful to Muslims, and what brings them near to God and removes them far from His anger.

4. Since no kalām on any of the subjects which we have mentioned has been related from the Prophet, we know that such kalām is an innovation and such inquiry a deviation. For if it were good, the Prophet and his Companions would not have failed to discuss it. For the absence of such kalām on the part of the Prophet and his Companions can be explained in only two ways: either they knew it and were silent about it; or they did not know it, nay, were ignorant of it. Now if they knew it and did not discuss it, then we also may be silent about it, as they were, and we may abstain from plunging into it, as they abstained. For if it were a part of religion, they could not have been silent about it. On the other hand, if they did not know it, then we may have the same ignorance of it. For if it were a part of religion, they would not have been ignorant of it. So according to both explanations such kalām is an innovation and plunging into it is a deviation.

This is the summary of their argument for abstaining from reasoning about the basic dogmas of religion.

FIRST ANSWER

5. There are three ways of answering that argument. The first is to turn the question against them by saying: It is also true that the Prophet never said: « If anyone should inquire into that and discuss it (10), regard him as a deviating

(10) i.e. kalām on such subjects as those mentioned in N° 2.

innovator ». So you are constrained to regard yourselves as deviating innovators, since you have discussed something which the Prophet did not discuss, and you have accused of deviation him whom the Prophet did not so accuse.

SECOND ANSWER

6. The second answer is to say to them: Actually the Prophet was not ignorant of any item of the kalām which you have mentioned concerning body and accident, motion and rest, atom and leap. It is true (11) that he did not discuss every one of these points specifically; and the same is true of the jurisprudents (12) and learned men among the Companions. Nevertheless, the basic principles of these things which you have mentioned specifically are present in the Qurʾān and the Sunna in general terms, not in detail.

7. Take motion and rest and the kalām about them. Their basic principle is present in the Qurʾān, where they prove the affirmation of God's oneness; and so for union and separateness. In relating what His friend Abraham said in the story of the setting of the star and the sun and the moon and their being moved from place to place, (13) God said what proves that his (Abraham's) Lord cannot be subject to any of that, and that one who is subject to setting and translation from place to place is not a divinity.

8. The kalām on the basic principles of the profession of God's oneness is also taken from the Book. God said: « Were there divinities other than God in them, the heavens and the earth would be in disorder » (21.22). This kalām is a

(11) Lit. « leap, even though he did not... ».

(12) Strictly speaking, there were no « jurisprudents » among the Companions. Perhaps the old meaning of « fiqh » should be understood here, i.e. insight, especially into matters of religion.

(13) Cf. *Lumaʿ*, N° 11.

brief reminder of the proof that God is unique and peerless (14), and the kalām of the mutakallimūn, in which they argue to the divine unicity from mutual hindrance and contention, simply goes back to this verse. God also (15) said: « God has taken for Himself no son, and there is no other divinity with Him — else each divinity would have taken away what he had created, and some would have been superior to others » (23.91/93). And so on until (16) He said: « Or have they appointed for God partners who have created even as He has, so that creation is a puzzle to them?» (13.16/17) The kalām of the mutakallimūn, in which they argue to the unicity of God, simply goes back to these verses which we have mentioned. And similarly, all the kalām which treats in detail of the questions deriving from the basic dogmas of God's oneness and justice is simply taken from the Qurʾān.

9. Such is also the case with the kalām on the possibility and the impossibility of the resurrecton (of the body). This question had been disputed by intelligent Arabs and by others before them until they were amazed at the possibility of that and said: «What! When we have died and become dust? That is an incredible return!» (50.3); and: « Never, never a hope of what you are promised!» (23.36/38); and: «Who will quicken bones when they have decayed? » (36.78); and God's words: « Does he promise you that when you shall have died and become dust and bones you will be brought forth? » (23. 35/37) Apropos of such kalām of theirs God put into the Qurʾān argument designed to confirm, from the viewpoint of reason, the possibility of the resurrection after death. Moreover, He taught and instructed His Prophet how to argue

(14) Lit. « without a partner » (*sharīk*).

(15) Better perhaps: « to this verse, and to God's saying... ».

(16) Perhaps a *wāw* should be inserted before « *ilā qawlihi* », and then the translation would read: « superior to others..., and to God's saying... ».

against their denial of the resurrection in two ways, according to the two groups of adversaries (17). For one group admitted the first creation, but denied the second, while the other group denied both (18) on the ground that the world is eternal.

10. So against him who admitted the first creation God (19) argued by saying: « Answer: He will quicken them who produced them a first time » (36.79), and by saying: « It is He who gives life by a first creation, then restores it; and it is very easy for Him » (30.27/26), and by His words: « As He first made you, you will return » (7.29/28). By these verses He called their attention to the fact that he who is able to effect something without reference to a preexisting exemplar is all the more able to effect something which has already been produced. Indeed, the latter is easier for him, as you know from your own axperience. But in the case of the Creator, it is not « easier » for Him to create one thing than to create another.

(20) It has been said that the objective pronominal suffix in *ʿalaihi* (for him) is an allusion to the capacity of creatures, the meaning being: It is easier and lighter for one of you to be raised and restored than to be created the first time. For his initial creation is always associated with parturition, rearing, severance of the umbilical cord, swaddling clothes, cutting the teeth, and other painful and distressing signs, whereas his restoration takes only a single instant in which there is none of that. Hence his restoration is easier on him than his initial creation.

(17) Lit. « according to two groups of them — a group which admitted... and a group which denied... ».

(18) i.e. both the first and the second creations.

(19) It is not perfectly clear whether God or Muḥammad is the subject. In any case it does not matter much, because the argument is that revealed by God and used by Muḥammad.

(20) This paragraph is an exegetical note which is almost independent of the text. Cf. Baiḍāwī on this verse.

This, then, was the argument which God (21) adduced against the group which admitted creation.

11. As for the group which denied both the first creation and the second, and maintained the eternity of the world, a doubt entered their minds simply because they said: « It is our experience that life is wet and hot, and death is cold and dry, akin to the nature of earth. How, then, can there be any amalgamation (22) of life and earth and decayed bones, resulting in a sound creation, since two contraries do not combine? » For this reason, then, they denied the resurrection.

12. It is certainly true that two contraries do not combine in one substrate, or in one direction, or in what exists (already) in the substrate. But they can exist in two substrates by way of propinquity. So God argued against them by saying: « He who makes fire for you from the green tree — for lo! you kindle fire from it » (36.80). In saying that, God referred them to their own knowledge and experience of the emergence of fire from green trees, notwithstanding the heat and dryness of the former and the coldness and wetness of the latter. Again, God made the possibility of the first production a proof of the possibility of the last production, because it is a proof of the possibility of the propinquity of life to earth and decayed bones and of making it a sound creation — for He said: « Just as we created man a first time, so we shall restore him » (21.104).

13. As for the discussion of the mutakallimūn involving (the principle) that (the series of) things which begin to exist has a first member, and their refutation of the Materialists who hold that there is no motion not preceded by a motion, and no day not preceded by a day, and the kalām against him who holds that there is no atom which cannot be halved

(21) Or, Muḥammad.

(22) Fusion, union, or combination would perhaps be better.

ad infinitum — we find the basis of that in the Sunna of God's Apostle. On a certain occasion he said: « There is no contagious disease and no bad omen. » (23) And a Bedouin said: « Then what is the matter with camels, flawless as gazelles, which mingle with scabby camels and become scabby? » And the Prophet said: « And who infected the first? » And the Bedouin was silent because of what he had made him understand by that rational argument. Likewise we say to him who claims that there is no motion not preceded by a motion: If that were the case, then not a single motion would ever have begun to be, because the (antecedently) limitless cannot begin to be.

14. Similarly, when a certain man said: (24) « O Prophet of God! My wife has borne a black male child » — and he hinted that he would repudiate it — the Prophet said: « Have you any camels? » He replied: « Yes » The Prophet said: « What color are they? » He said: « Red. » And the Apostle of God said: « Is there an ash-colored one among them? » He said: « Yes, there is an ash-colored one among them. » The Prophet said: « And whence came that? » He said: « Perhaps a sweat (25) spoiled it. » And the Prophet said: « And perhaps a sweat spoiled your son. » This, then, is the way in which God taught His Prophet to refer a thing to its kind and like, and it is our basis in all the judgments we make regarding the similar and the like.

15. We use that argument against him who holds that God resembles creatures and is a body by saying to him: (26) If God resembled anything, He would have to resemble it either in all of its respects or in one of its respects. Now if He resembled it in all of its respects, He would of necessity be produced in all of His respects. And if He resembled it in one of its respects, He would of necessity be produced, like it, in that respect in which He resembled it. For every two like things are judged the same regarding that in which they are alike. But it is impossible for the produced to be eternal, and for the eternal to be produced. Indeed God has said: « There is nothing like Him » (42.11/9), and He has said: « There is no one equal to Him » (112.4).

(23) I have not succeeded in finding any reference to this story.
(24) This story, too, is unknown to me from any other source.
(25) The word may have other meanings, and perhaps even a technical meaning here; but the point is not very important.
(26) Cf. *Lumaʿ*, N° 7.

16. The basis for declaring that the body has a limit, and that the atom cannot be divided (ad infinitum), is the statement of God: « And everything has been numbered by us in a clear archetype » (36.12/11). (27) Now one cannot number what has no limit, and the single thing cannot be divided (ad infinitum). For this would necessitate that they (endlessly) be two things — and God has declared that numbering applies to them both.

17. The basis for declaring that the act must be effected for the Producer of the world as He intends and chooses, and in the absence of any aversion for it on His part, is the utterance of God: « Do you not then see what you eject? Is it you who create it? Or are we the creators? » (56.58/59). And they could not affirm with proof that they created (it). (28) Despite their desire to have a child, he would not come if God was unwilling that he should. Thus God called their attention to the fact the Creator is He from whom creatures proceed according to His intention.

18. The basis of our rational refutation of our adversary is taken from the Sunna of our Master, Muḥammad. I refer to the teaching he received from God when he met the fat rabbi

(27) And cf. 72.28.
(28) Cf. *Lumaʿ*, N° 5.

and said to him: « I conjure thee by God, do you find in what God has revealed of the Torah that God detests the fat rabbi?» And the rabbi became angry at being thus reproached, and he said: « God has not sent down anything to a human being!» (6.91). Then God said (29): « Say: Who sent down the Book which Moses brought as light and guidance for men? etc. » (6.91). So he quickly refuted him, because the Torah is a thing, and Moses a human being, and the rabbi admitted that God had sent down the Torah to Moses. And in a similar way he refuted the men who claimed that God had enjoined upon them that they should not believe an apostle until he should come to them with a sacrifice which fire would consume (3.183/179). For God said: « Say: Apostles before me have already brought you evidences, and the very thing you have mentioned. Why, then, did you kill them, if you are truthful?» (3.183/180). And by means of that he refuted them and argued against them.

19. Our basis in correcting the sophistry of our adversaries is taken from the words of God: « You and what you worship, apart from God, will be fuel for Gehenna. You are drawing near to it! If these false gods had been divinities, they would not have arrived at (Gehenna). All will be there eternally. There they will send forth groans, but they will not be (30) heard » (21.98/100). For when this verse came down (31), word of it reached ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zibaʿrâ — a disputatious and contentious man — and he said: « I have as good as triumphed over Muḥammad and the Lord of the Kaʿba! » Then the Apostle of God came to him, and ʿAbdallāh said: « O Muḥammad, do you not claim that Jesus and ʿUzair and the angels were worshiped?» And the Prophet was silent (32), not

(29) Cf. Baiḍāwī on this verse.
(30) Cf. Blachère, II, 301, n. 100.
(31) Cf. Baiḍāwī on this verse.
(32) The Arabic text has a note here, citing Baiḍāwī, to the effect that Muḥammad was not silent, but answered straightway.

from confusion or the lack of anything to say, but from astonishment at ʿAbdallāh's ignorance, because there is nothing in the verse which necessitates the entrance into it of Jesus and ʿUzair and the angels. For God said: « and what you worship »; but He did not say: « and everything which you worship, apart from God.» But Ibn al-Zibaʿrâ simply wanted to argue speciously against the Prophet, in order to make his people think that he had argued against Muḥammad successfully. So God sent down the verse: « Those, indeed, who have already received from us the best (reward)» — i.e. those of them who are worshiped — « are far removed from it (Gehenna)!» (21.101). The Prophet then recited that verse, and thereupon they raised a great outcry to mask their confusion and their error, and they said: « Are our divinities better, or is he?» — i.e. Jesus. So God sent down the verses: « When the Son of Mary is proposed as an example, see how your people turn away from him. They ask: 'Are our divinities better, or is he?' They have proposed this example to you only out of disputatiousness. Truly they are a contentious people » (43. 57/58). (33)

20. All the verses which we have mentioned, as well as many which we have not mentioned, are a basis and argument for us in our kalām on what we mention in detail. It is true that no question was particularized in the Book and the Sunna. But that was because the particularization of questions involving rational principles did not take place in the days of the Prophet. However, (he and) the Companions did engage in kalām of the sort which we have mentioned. (34)

(33) These verses seem to have been revealed on a different occasion from that of the encounter with al-Zibaʿrâ — cf. Blachère, II, 264, n. 57.
(34) This translation seems to me to convey the sense, though the Arabic itself seems rather awkward.

THIRD ANSWER

21. The third answer is that the Apostle of God did know these questions about which they have asked, and he was not ignorant of any detail involved in them. However, they did not occur in his time in such specific form that he should have, or should not have, discussed them — even though their basic principles were present in the Qurʾān and the Sunna. But whenever a question arose which was related to religion from the standpoint of the Law, men discussed it, and inquired into it, and disputed about it, and debated and argued. Such, for example, were the questions concerning the fraction of the inheritance (35) to which grandmothers are entitled — which is one of the questions involving obligations — and other questions touching on legal determinations. Such, too, were the questions pertaining to what is unlawful, and to the effects of irrevocable divorce (36), and to « *ḥabluki ʿalā ghāribiki* » (37), and the questions concerning ḥadd-punishments (38) and divorce. These questions, too numerous to mention, arose in their days, and in the case of each one of them there had come no explicit determination from the Prophet. For if he had given explicit instructions concerning all that, they would not have differed over those questions, and the difference would not have lasted until now.

(35) Arabic: *al-ʿawl* — cf. Santillana, *Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malachita*, II, 512-513.

(36) Arabic: *waʾl-bāʾin waʾl-batta* — cf. Santillana, *op. cit.*, Index B, under *Bāʾin* and *Battah*.

(37) Literally: Thy rope is upon thy withers. The phrase referred originally to a she-camel allowed to graze freely, and hence has here the meaning: You are free to do as you like. Cf. Lane, s.v. *ghārib*. The formula seems to have been used in connection with both divorce and manumission: cf. A. W. T. Juynboll, *Jus Shafiiticum* (ed. of *al-Tanbīh* of Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī), Leiden, 1879, 174.8 and 212.4.

(38) i.e. penalties determined by the Qurʾānic law.

22. But even though there was no explicit instruction of the Apostle of God regarding each one of these questions, they referred and likened each to something which had been determined explicitly by the Book of God, and the Sunna, and their own ijtihād (39). Such questions (40), then, which involved judgments on unprecedented secondary cases, they referred to those determinations of the Law which are derivative, and which are to be sought only along the line of revelation and apostolic tradition. But when new and specific questions pertaining to the basic dogmas arise, every intelligent Muslim ought to refer judgment on them to the sum of principles accepted on the grounds of reason, sense experience, intuition, etc. For judgment on legal questions which belong to the category of the traditional is to be based on reference to legal principles which likewise belong to the category of the traditional. And judgment on questions involving the data of reason and the senses should be a matter of referring every such instance to (something within) its own category, without confounding the rational with the traditional, or the traditional with the rational. So if kalām on the creation of the Qurʾān and on the atom and the leap, in these precise terms, had originated in the Prophet's time, he would have discussed and explained it, just as he explained and discussed all the specific questions which did originate in his time.

23. Then one should say: There is no sound tradition from the Prophet to the effect that the Qurʾān is uncreated or created. Why, then, do you hold that it is uncreated? They may say: Some (41) of the Companions and the Followers

(39) i.e. their own personal exertion — cf. art. *Idjtihād*, in EI or Hwb.

(40) I find the Arabic of this sentence (and of much of this number) rather difficult, though I think I have conveyed the thought of the author.

(41) Or: « One of... » The Arabic *baʿḍ* is sometimes ambiguous.

held that. One should say to them: The Companion, or the Follower, is subject to the same constraint as you are, namely, that he is a deviating innovator for saying what the Apostle did not say. And another may say: I suspend my judgment on that, and I do not say created, nor do I say uncreated. To him one should say: Then you, in suspending your judgment on that, are a deviating innovator. For the Prophet did not say: « If this question should arise after my death, suspend your judgment on it, and say nothing. » Nor did he say: « Regard as deviating and unbelieving him who affirms that it is created, or, him who denies that it is created. »

24. Furthermore, tell us: If one were to say that God's knowledge is created, would you suspend your judgment on that, or not? If they say no, then say to them: Neither the Prophet nor his Companions said a word about that. And likewise, if someone were to say: Is this Lord of yours surfeited with food, or with drink, or is He clothed, or naked, or cold, or bilious, or damp, or a body, or an accident, or does He smell odors, or not smell them, or has He a nose, and a heart, and a liver, and a spleen, and does He make the pilgrimage every year, and does He ride horseback, or not, and is He grieved, or not — and other questions of that sort — you would have to refuse to answer him. For neither the Apostle of God nor his Companions ever discussed a single one of those points. Or you would not remain silent, and would explain by your kalām that none of those things can be predicated of God, etc. etc., because of this argument, and that, etc.

25. Someone may say: I should be silent and answer him not a word, or, I should shun him, or, I should leave him, or, I should not greet him, or, I should not visit him if he fell sick, or, I should show no respect to his corpse if he died. To him one should say: Then you would be bound to be, in all these ways which you have mentioned, a deviating innovator.

For the Apostle of God never said: « If anyone should ask about any of those things, refuse to answer him, or, do not greet him, or, leave him. » Since he said nothing of the sort, you would be innovators if you did that.

26. Moreover, why have you not refused to answer him. who says that the Qurʾān is created? (42) And why have you accused him of unbelief? There is no sound tradition from the Prophet on denying its creation and accusing of unbelief him who says that it is created. They may say: Because Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal denied that it is created and held that he who says that it is created should be accused of unbelief. One should say to them: And why did not Aḥmad keep silent about that instead of discussing it? They may say: Because ʿAbbās al-ʿAnbarī, and Wakīʿ, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, said that the Qurʾān is uncreated, and that he who says that it is created is an unbeliever. One should say to them: And why did not they keep silent about what Muḥammad had not discussed? They may say: Because ʿAmr b. Dīnār, and Sufyān b. ʿUyaina, and Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, said that it is neither creating nor created. One should say to them: And why did not they refrain from saying this, since the Apostle of God did not say it?

27. And if they refer that back to the Companions, this is sheer obstinacy. For one may say to them: And why did not they refrain from saying that, since the Prophet did not discuss it, and did not say: « Call him who says it an unbeliever. » They may say: The ʿulamāʾ simply must engage in kalām on a new question, so that the ignorant may know how to judge the matter. One should say: This is the admission which we

(42) On this question, and the names mentioned by the author, cf. the references given in n. (1), p. 20, supra.

wanted you to make! Why, then, do you hinder (men from engaging in) kalām? You use it yourselves when you want to; but when you are silenced (in a discussion), you say: We are forbidden to engage in kalām. And when you want to, you blindly and unquestioningly follow your predecessors, without argument or explanation. This is willfulness and capriciousness!

28. Then one should say to them: The Prophet did not discuss vows and testamentary injunctions, or manumission, or the manner of reckoning the uninterrupted transmission of estates, nor did he compose a book about those things, as did Mālik, and al-Thawrī, and al-Shāfiʿī, and Abū Ḥanīfa (43). Hence you are forced to admit that they were deviating innovators, since they did what the Prophet had not done, and said what he had not said explicitly, and composed what the Prophet had not composed, and said that those who maintain that the Qurʾān is created are to be called unbelievers, though the Prophet had not said that.

What we have said contains enough to satisfy any intelligent man who is not perversely stubborn. The work is ended — praise be to God, and His blessing be on our Master, Muḥammad, and his household, and his Companions!

(43) Four renowned Jurisprudents and founders of legal schools. The reader will find articles on them in EI (al-Thawrī under Sufyān), and Hwb (except al-Thawrī).

Part Two

THE APPENDICES